Analysis and Management of Conflict in Myanmar

১৫ ই জুন, ২০২৪ রাত ৯:২০

Overview Myanmar
The military coup of February 2021 marked a return to direct military rule in Myanmar, which has triggered large-scale protests and civil unrest. In response, the military used brutal force and clamped down on political freedoms. Meanwhile, politicians elected previously established an exile shadow government and armed groups declared war against the military.

Furthermore, the return to military rule has also undone much of the economic progress achieved in the last decade. While the junta has reintroduced import substitution policies and protectionism, the coup, the protests, and the pandemic have had dire economic consequences, causing a bank crisis, soaring inflation rates, and widespread social issues.

Due to the political and economic turmoil, many international companies left, with hardly any new foreign investment coming into the country. The junta announced sham elections for late 2023 as an attempt to create legitimacy.
Source: Myanmar Country Report 2024






Background
Myanmar gained independence from Britain in 1948 as a parliamentary democracy. A 1964 coup led by the military (the Tatmadaw) installed a military junta and gave the Tatmadaw sweeping constitutional, political, and economic power. The Tatmadaw officially handed power over to a civilian government in 2011, but the Tatmadaw retained significant political power and autonomy under the new civilian government. Following the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) victory in the elections of 2021, the military again executed a coup and established the State Administration Council (SAC) as Myanmar’s government. In May 2021, the ousted National Unity Government (NUG) declared the creation of a People’s Defence Force, igniting the current conflict in Myanmar. Currently, the NUG is the largest coalition of opposition forces to the junta and are the main group in conflict with them. The 2021 coup has caused heightened violence between other opposition forces and the junta and has exacerbated the ongoing genocide of the Rohingya in the Rakhine State. There is currently no meaningful international intervention as Western nations do not perceive gains to be had from intervening.







The current conflict in Myanmar began with the 2021 coup d’état. The conflict between the junta and the pro-democracy movement has accelerated environmental degradation and hurt Myanmar’s economic standing. Demographic stress has also worsened both from the junta’s lack of attention to urban infrastructure and its targeting of rural villages, increasing the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The return to military rule has caused a worsening trend for most indicators used to determine the degree of conflict. This diagnostic uses the methodology created by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy to establish possible short-term scenarios based on conflict indicators determining trend lines and degree of risk. The military coup has destabilized the country which has resulted in a return to military rule causing a worsening conflict trend and making any peaceful settlement unlikely shortly.












Since the February 2021 military coup in Myanmar, the junta has driven the country further into a human rights and humanitarian catastrophe. At least 55 townships are under martial law. Faced with opposition from the general population and pro-democracy armed groups, the military has struggled to maintain control over the country. The junta’s widespread and systematic abuses against the population—including arbitrary arrests, torture, extrajudicial killings, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians—amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Citing ongoing violence, Myanmar’s junta postponed a planned so-called election slated for August after extending a “state of emergency” for the fourth time since the coup. The junta announced slightly reduced sentences for National League for Democracy (NLD) party leader Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, who are serving lengthy sentences on multiple bogus charges.
Some countries have imposed targeted sanctions, but the international response to the crisis has been uncoordinated. The Myanmar military has yet to face real consequences for the abuses it has committed, both before and since the coup.
Shrinking Civic Space and Junta’s Sham “Elections”
In March, the junta announced that the NLD was among 40 political parties and other groups dissolved for failing to register according to the new Political Party Registration Law. The law’s provisions appear intended to delay indefinitely, rather than facilitate, Myanmar’s return to civilian democratic rule. Many parties, including the NLD, refused to comply with the requirement that they register within 60 days of the law’s promulgation because they believed the military’s proposed “elections” will not be credible.
Under the new law and earlier martial law orders, any election would be dominated by junta-backed political parties and the military itself, which already holds 25 percent of seats in the national and local legislatures under the 2008 Constitution. In the face of widespread political oppression, free and fair elections are not possible in Myanmar for the foreseeable future.
The junta claims it has digitized early census data of up to 51 million individuals and had collected the biometric data of up to 700,000 individuals by August. The junta’s Ministry of Immigration and Population is collecting fingerprints, iris scans, face scans, and other personal details to link this data to citizenship documents, passports, bank details, and purchases, such as for SIM cards and mobile phones. These efforts may increase digital surveillance of activists, human rights defenders, and opposition members and be used to further scrutinize citizenship rights of ethnic and minority groups.
Targeted Arrests and Denial of Fair Trial Rights
The targeting of activists and rights defenders has escalated over the past year. At least 24,000 anti-coup protesters have been arrested since the coup and 4,000 killed, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. The Peace Research Institute of Oslo estimates actual figures are much higher.
In the face of mass arrests, dozens of lawyers in Myanmar have attempted to represent those arrested and provide them a legal defense. At every turn, however, lawyers have faced systematic obstacles imposed by military authorities and restrictions impeding their work. They themselves have faced threats, arbitrary arrests and detention, and politically motivated prosecution, and in some instances, torture and ill-treatment.
The junta has created “special courts,” closed courts inside prisons to fast-track politically sensitive cases. As a result, many cases that would have been heard before regular criminal courts before the coup are now under the jurisdiction of these junta-controlled special courts. Restrictions on lawyers inside special courts have denied suspects their rights to due process and a fair trial.
In parallel, military tribunals that are in operation in townships under martial law determine cases for civilians but are entirely opaque and closed to public scrutiny.
In August, the junta announced the release of thousands of prisoners in an amnesty that coincided with the reduction of Aung San Suu Kyi’s and Win Myint’s sentences. However, as in the past, few of those released were political prisoners, and many of those released had already served most of their sentences and were soon due for release. Myanmar’s military authorities have long used amnesties as a tool to gain credibility and deflect international pressure.
In September, a court sentenced photojournalist Sai ZawThaike, of the banned independent publication Myanmar Now, to 20 years in prison with hard labor, in a trial carried out inside Insein prison where he had no legal representation. His sentence is the longest given to any journalist since the coup.
Military Attacks on Civilian Populations
On April 11, the military used a thermobaric bomb during an attack on an opposition building in the village of Pa ZiGyi in Sagaing Region, killing more than 160 people, including many children. This enhanced-blast type munition caused indiscriminate and disproportionate civilian casualties in violation of international humanitarian law and was an apparent war crime.
Other attacks in which Myanmar’s military may be responsible for laws-of-war violations include airstrikes on April 10 in Chin State that killed nine civilians and in Bago Region on May 2 that killed three civilians. An air and ground assault in Magway Region on April 21 burned a Japan-funded hospital. And in March, after the military captured a town in Shan State, 22 people were summarily executed, with many of the victims bearing marks of torture.
On October 9, the Myanmar military attacked a village hosting hundreds of displaced civilians in Kachin State, killing 28 civilians, including 11 children, committing an apparent war crime.
Across the country, including in other areas such as in Chin, Kachin, Karen, and Karenni States, airstrikes by the military have increased significantly in 2023. Airstrikes in some regions have increased more than 300 percent in the past year. The military has also continued using domestically produced cluster munitions; their use was first recorded in Myanmar after the coup. Cluster munitions are prohibited under a 2008 convention signed by 123 countries; Myanmar has not signed it.
Non-state armed groups have also committed crimes against civilians, including sexual violence and grave violations against children.
Displacement and Humanitarian Aid
Nearly 2 million people have been internally displaced and 94,000 refugees have fled to neighboring countries. On October 27, fighting between the military and a coalition of ethnic armed groups and People’s Defense Forces caused about 500,000 people across the country to be newly displaced. Many internally displaced people have fled air and ground attacks multiple times. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said 18 million people required humanitarian aid.
Junta restrictions on humanitarian aid have threatened millions in conflict areas. The Myanmar military has deliberately blocked aid as a form of collective punishment. The blockages sustain the military’s longstanding “four cuts” strategy, in which the armed forces maintain control of an area by isolating and terrorizing the civilian population.
On May 14, Cyclone Mocha—which is tied with another for strongest tropical cyclone ever recorded in the northern Indian Ocean—made landfall, leaving a trail of destruction and affecting at least 7.9 million people across Chin, Kachin, and Rakhine States and Sagaing and Magway Regions, according to OCHA figures. “The impact of climate change on children and families is clear for all to see,” UNICEF noted following the cyclone. Junta authorities refused to authorize travel and visas for aid workers, release urgent supplies from customs and warehouses, or relax onerous and unnecessary restrictions on lifesaving assistance.
The junta’s restrictions disregarded many international calls regarding humanitarian aid, most notably the five-point consensus from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the December 2022 UN Security Council resolution, which urged “full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access.”
Conflict and reduced agricultural production are contributing to significant food insecurity, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. In addition, a severe devaluation of the Myanmar currency led to dire banking and supply chain crises and shortages of food, medicine, and other essentials.




Rohingya Apartheid
More than 600,000 Rohingya in Myanmar continue to live under apartheid conditions, facing persecution and effective imprisonment from the junta authorities. Of this population, roughly 140,000 Rohingya have been confined to camps in central Rakhine State since 2012, denied the right to return to their homes.
The junta continued carrying out the problematic “camp closure” process, which entails replacing temporary longhouses with permanent structures built on top of or near the existing sites, further entrenching segregation. Across the camps in central Rakhine State, fewer than half of all camp shelters have received any repairs over the past two years.
When Cyclone Mocha hit, local junta authorities failed to adequately communicate the storm’s risks, assist Rohingya in finding shelter or transportation, or support search-and-rescue operations following the storm.
Bangladesh authorities and the Myanmar junta took steps toward a pilot repatriation process, which has been marked by coercion and deceit. Conditions for the safe, sustainable, and dignified return of Rohingya did not exist throughout the year.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Myanmar’s penal code punishes “carnal intercourse against the order of nature” with up to 10 years in prison and a fine. Under the military junta, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people have been particularly likely to be targeted with sexual violence in custody.
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Since the coup, there has been an uptick in reports of sexual violence and other forms of gendered harassment by both military and non-state perpetrators. In addition, women and girls remain extremely vulnerable to gender-based violence, particularly in the context of ongoing conflict. Women also reported a significant decline in their ability to participate in politics and education. Sixteen percent of girls and 5 percent of boys are married before age 18, and women and girls are at risk of trafficking for sexual exploitation inside and outside the country.
Key International Actors
Since passing a resolution on Myanmar in December 2022, the UN Security Council has done little more than issue a few statements. The Myanmar military has continued to ignore the resolution, and the council has taken no further concrete, meaningful actions: it has not instituted a global arms embargo, referred the country situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), or imposed binding targeted sanctions on junta leadership and military-owned companies.
The European Union passed a sixth and then a seventh tranche of restrictions on Myanmar in February and July, imposing sanctions on a total of 99 individuals and 19 entities.
In May, the UN special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, released a report on the US$1 billion trade in arms and raw materials for weapons since the coup. It traced the flow of weapons and materiel to entities based in Russia, China, Singapore, Thailand, and India. The report described how arms dealers have relied on lax enforcement and avoided sanctions by using “front companies.”
In June, the United States imposed sanctions on Myanmar’s defense ministry and two banks, Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) and Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB), used by the junta to purchase weapons and other dual-use goods. In response, Singapore’s United Overseas Bank, the foreign bank of choice for Myanmar’s military, suspended all bank-to-bank transfers. Bangladesh’s Sonali bank has also frozen transfers and accounts of MFTB and MICB.
On August 23, the US extended targeted sanctions to include aviation fuel, citing the Myanmar military’s increased attacks on civilians. The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) determined sanctions “to be imposed on any foreign individual or entity that operates in the jet fuel sector” of the Myanmar economy. OFAC also designated sanctions on two individuals and one entity involved in the procurement and distribution of jet fuel as well as two other entities owned by the two individuals.
On October 31, the US imposed a ban on financial transactions involving the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), which goes into effect on December 15. The directive prohibits persons and companies under US jurisdiction from directly or indirectly providing financial services to MOGE, including deposits, transfers, loans, insurance, investments, foreign exchange, and other services. The US, Canada, and the United Kingdom also coordinated on additional sanctions on individuals and entities.
Earlier in the year, Canada, the UK, and the EU had imposed targeted sanctions on specific individuals and entities involved in supplying aviation fuel to the Myanmar military. However, at least five British insurance companies are still providing coverage for aviation fuel deliveries to Myanmar.
In September, ASEAN decided at its annual summit that Myanmar would not be allowed to chair the bloc, whose chair rotates every year in alphabetical order, in 2026. ASEAN member states decided that a “troika,” comprising the immediate past, present, and incoming future chairs of ASEAN, would handle Myanmar issues going forward.
At the ICC, the prosecutor continued his office’s investigation into alleged crimes against humanity following the 2017 ethnic cleansing campaign against the Rohingya based on the completion of these crimes in Bangladesh, an ICC member country. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar continued gathering evidence for future prosecutions.
The Gambia’s case alleging Myanmar’s violation of the Genocide Convention is ongoing before the International Court of Justice, with Myanmar filing its counter-memorial in August. On November 15, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK filed a joint declaration to intervene in support of The Gambia’s case.
Source: Human Rights Watch












Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, gained independence from Britain in 1948, but its post-independence history has been characterized by unrest and conflict, with long-standing struggles for ethnic and sub-national autonomy.
It was long considered a pariah state while under the rule of a military junta from 1962 to 2011 that suppressed almost all dissent and stood accused of gross human rights abuses, prompting international condemnation and sanctions.
A gradual liberalisation began in 2010, leading to free elections in 2015 and the installation of a government led by veteran opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi the following year.
But a 2017 army operation in Rakhine state drove more than half a million Muslim Rohingyas to flee to neighboring Bangladesh, in what the United Nations called a "textbook example of ethnic cleansing".
It damaged the new government's international reputation, and highlighted the military's continuing grip. This was confirmed when Aung San Suu Kyi and her government were overthrown in a coup in February 2021.









Country Profiles -
Republic of The Union Of Myanmar:
Capital: Nay Pyi Taw
Area: 676,570 sq km
Population: 57.2 million
Languages: Burmese, plus Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon, Rakhine, Shan
Life expectancy: 63 years (men) 69 years (women)


LEADERS
President: (acting) MyintSwe


IMAGE SOURCE,GETTY IMAGES
Min Aung Hlaing seized power in a military coup in 2021

The army promoted Vice-President MyintSwe to the acting presidency in February 2021, after overthrowing President U Win Myint and de-facto head of government Aung San Suu Kyi in a coup.Real power lies with commander-in-chief and coup leader Min Aung Hlaing. Aung San Suu Kyi had run the country as State Counsellor since the end of military rule in 2016.








MEDIA


IMAGE SOURCE,GETTY IMAGES
The 2021 coup "shattered the media landscape" and the junta - which "tolerates no alternative to its narrative" - quickly banned outspoken outlets, says Reporters Without Borders (RSF). By the end of 2022, Myanmar had the third-highest number of imprisoned journalists in the world, after Iran and China, says the Committee to Protect Journalists. The state media "are just propaganda outlets that receive scant attention from the population", says RSF.








TIMELINE

IMAGE SOURCE, GETTY IMAGES
Bagan, formerly Pagan, was the capital of the medieval Bagan Kingdom, the first state to unify the regions that would later constitute Myanmar

Some key dates in Myanmar's history:

2nd Century AD - First-known city-states emerge in central Myanmar founded by Tibeto-Burman-speaking migrants from from present-day Yunnan.
1057 - King Anawrahta founds the first unified Myanmar state at Bagan and adopts Theravada Buddhism.
1287 - Bagan kingdom collapsed following repeated Mongol invasions,which leads to 250 years of political fragmentation.
1510-1752 - The Toungoo dynasty reunites the country as Burma.
1752-1885 - The Konbaung dynasty continues the administrative reforms begun by the Toungoo dynasty, laying the foundations of the modern state of Burma. These, however, prove insufficient to stave off the British.
1826 - First Anglo-Burmese War: Burma loses Arakan, Manipur, Assam and Tenasserim to the British.
1852-53 - Second Anglo-Burmese War: Much of central Burma occupied by British.
1885 - Third Anglo-Burmese War: UK annexes the rest of Burma, due to concerns over rival power France's takeover of Indochina.
1937 - Burma becomes a separately administered colony. Ba Maw, the first prime minister advocates for self-rule and opposes UK participation in World War Two.
1940 - Nationalist leader Aung San forms the Burma Independence Army in Japan.
1942-45 - Japan invades Burma, Allied forces launch major offensives to recapture Burma in late 1944, which is finally cleared of Japanese troops in July 1945.
The Burma National Army and the Arakan National Army fought with the Japanese from 1942 to 1944 but switched to the Allied side in 1945.
1947 - Aung San and British prime minister Clement Attlee agree on Burmese independence for the following year. Aung San's party wins power in a general elections to form a transitional government but he and most of his cabinet are assassinated by political rivals.
1948 - Burma becomes independent.
1962 - Military led by General Ne Win seizes power in a coup. In subsequent decades, they will ruthlessly suppress all forms of dissent. Burma has become one of the region's most impoverished countries.
1990 - The Opposition National League for Democracy wins a landslide victory in first multiparty elections in almost 30 years but the military ignores the result.
2006 - The military junta, which had moved the national capital from Yangon to a site in central Burma in November 2005, names it Nay PyiDaw.
2015 - Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy wins enough seats in parliament to form a government.
2018 - UN accuses Myanmar of genocide against Rohingya Muslims.
2021 - The government was overthrown in a military coup.



A million Muslim Rohingya reportedly fled persecution at the hands of the military and locals who burned villages to the ground in 2017
Source: BBC 2023
 
Foreword
Conflict is a pervasive and deeply entrenched reality in our world. Myanmar, a nation of rich cultural diversity and profound historical significance, has unfortunately not been spared from its tumultuous grip. The complexities of its societal fabric, historical grievances, and political dynamics have created a landscape marred by strife and division.
In this analysis and management of conflict in Myanmar, we embark on a journey to understand the intricate layers of discord that have plagued this beautiful land. From the struggles for ethnic autonomy to the challenges of democratic transition, Myanmar's path to peace is fraught with obstacles that demand careful examination and thoughtful solutions. Yet, amid the shadows of despair, there flickers a glimmer of hope. The resilience of the people, their unwavering commitment to justice, and the tireless efforts of peacebuilders and activists inspire us to believe that a brighter future is within reach. As we delve into the complexities of conflict, let us also remain steadfast in our resolve to seek pathways to reconciliation and healing.
This analysis is not merely an academic exercise; it is a call to action. It is a reminder that peace is not merely the absence of conflict but the presence of justice, equity, and respect for human dignity. It is a testament to our shared humanity and our collective responsibility to stand in solidarity with the people of Myanmar as they strive for a future defined by harmony and prosperity.
In the following pages, may we find insights illuminating the path forward, strategies that foster dialogue and understanding, and a renewed sense of urgency to work towards a Myanmar where peace reigns supreme.

Abul Kashem Muhammad Shaheen
Roll: 242106
Submitted to


Dr. Md. Touhidul Islam
Associate Professor
Department of Peace and Conflict Studies
Faculty of Social Sciences
Email: [email protected]
Mobile (Dept): 880-2-9661900/6740
Ext. (Dept): 6740
Mobile (Personal): 01819806335
Short Biography:
Dr Md. Touhidul Islam is an Associate Professor in the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh, and has a keen knack for analyzing conflict and situations alike. As a Commonwealth Scholar, he completed his PhD and MA from the University of Bradford, the United Kingdom. He has been teaching and researching various cutting-edge issues in the field and published several research articles on conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and hosting and relocating displaced Rohingyas in Bangladesh in reputed journals. His current research interests include migration, host-refugee management, violence, social cohesion, community engagement and resilience, conflict and peace processes, peacebuilding, fragility and resilience etc.

Source: University of Dhaka (Web portal)
 

Acknowledgment
I would like to express my gratitude to all those who contributed to the completion of this assignment on the analysis and management of conflicts in Myanmar.
First and foremost, I am deeply thankful to my supervisor/advisor for their guidance, support, and valuable insights throughout the process. Their expertise has been instrumental in shaping the direction of this assignment.
I would also like to extend my appreciation to the scholars, researchers, and practitioners whose work served as a foundation for the analysis presented in this assignment. Their contributions have enriched the discussion and provided valuable perspectives on the complexities of conflict in Myanmar.
Furthermore, I am grateful to the individuals and organizations who generously shared their time and expertise during interviews, discussions, and data collection processes. Their firsthand experiences and knowledge have provided valuable insights into the dynamics of conflict and its management in Myanmar.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my peers and colleagues for their constructive feedback, encouragement, and support throughout the development of this assignment. Their input has been invaluable in refining the analysis and ensuring its relevance and accuracy.
This assignment would not have been possible without the collective efforts of all those mentioned above. Thank you for your contributions and commitment to advancing understanding and fostering peace in Myanmar.


Abstract:
Myanmar, a nation grappling with a complex web of ethnic, political, and socio-economic tensions, presents a compelling case study for the analysis and management of conflicts. This paper examines the multifaceted nature of conflicts in Myanmar, delving into historical roots, contemporary dynamics, and underlying factors exacerbating tensions. Through a comprehensive review of scholarly literature, official reports, and media sources, this study identifies key drivers of conflicts, including ethnic diversity, political marginalization, resource competition, and historical grievances. Moreover, it explores various conflict management approaches employed by local and international stakeholders, ranging from peace negotiations and ceasefire agreements to humanitarian interventions and transitional justice mechanisms. By critically evaluating the effectiveness and limitations of these strategies, this paper offers insights into the complexities of conflict resolution in Myanmar and proposes holistic approaches that prioritize inclusivity, dialogue, and sustainable development. The findings underscore the imperative of addressing underlying structural inequalities and fostering genuine reconciliation to achieve lasting peace and stability in Myanmar.
Keywords: Myanmar, conflicts, ethnic diversity, political marginalization, reconciliation, conflict management, transitional justice, sustainable development.









Table of Contents
























1. Introduction
Understanding and managing conflicts in Myanmar is essential for addressing humanitarian concerns, promoting ethnic harmony and national unity, safeguarding political stability and democratic consolidation, fostering socio-economic development, enhancing regional and international relations, and upholding human rights and justice. Effective conflict management requires a comprehensive and inclusive approach that addresses the root causes of conflicts, engages all relevant stakeholders, and prioritizes sustainable peacebuilding efforts.
1.1 Humanitarian Concerns: Myanmar has been plagued by protracted conflicts that have resulted in widespread human suffering, including displacement, loss of lives, and violations of human rights. Addressing these conflicts is essential to alleviating the humanitarian crisis and ensuring the well-being of affected populations, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.
1.2 Ethnic Harmony and National Unity: Myanmar is home to a diverse array of ethnic groups, each with its own cultural heritage, language, and identity. The persistence of ethnic conflicts threatens the country's social cohesion and undermines efforts to foster national unity. Understanding and managing these conflicts is crucial for promoting ethnic harmony and building a more inclusive society where all ethnic communities can coexist peacefully.
1.3 Political Stability and Democratic Consolidation: Conflicts in Myanmar have posed significant challenges to the country's democratic transition and efforts to consolidate democratic governance. Political instability fueled by conflicts undermines the rule of law, weakens state institutions, and hampers the government's ability to address pressing socio-economic issues. Managing conflicts effectively is essential for safeguarding political stability and advancing the consolidation of democracy in Myanmar.
1.4 Socio-Economic Development: Persistent conflicts have impeded Myanmar's socio-economic development, hindering progress in key areas such as poverty reduction, education, healthcare, and infrastructure development. The diversion of resources towards military expenditures and conflict-related expenditures further exacerbates socio-economic disparities and perpetuates cycles of poverty and underdevelopment. Resolving conflicts is crucial for creating an enabling environment for sustainable development and improving the quality of life for all of Myanmar's citizens.

1.5 Regional and International Relations: Myanmar's conflicts have implications beyond its borders, affecting regional stability and international relations. Cross-border flows of refugees, arms, and illicit activities have regional ramifications, while international actors have a vested interest in promoting peace and stability in Myanmar. Managing conflicts effectively is essential for fostering constructive regional and international cooperation and preventing the spillover of conflicts into neighboring countries.
1.6 Human Rights and Justice: Conflict situations in Myanmar have been characterized by widespread human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, forced displacement, sexual violence, and discrimination against minority groups. Addressing conflicts is critical for upholding human rights, ensuring accountability for past atrocities, and promoting justice and reconciliation among affected communities.

2. Historical Background

2.1 Pre-colonial Era: Ethnic Diversity, Kingdoms, and Early Conflicts
Myanmar's pre-colonial history is characterized by a rich tapestry of ethnic diversity and the emergence of powerful kingdoms. The region was home to various ethnic groups, including the Bamar, Shan, Mon, Rakhine, and Karen, each with distinct cultures, languages, and traditions. The first major kingdom to emerge was the Pyu city-states in the central region, followed by the Mon kingdoms in the south and the Bagan Empire in the central plains. The Bagan Empire, which flourished between the 9th and 13th centuries, is renowned for its impressive architecture, including thousands of Buddhist temples and pagodas.
Despite periods of relative stability and cultural flourishing, the pre-colonial era also witnessed conflicts and power struggles between rival kingdoms and ethnic groups. These conflicts often revolved around territorial disputes, resource competition, and dynastic rivalries, shaping the socio-political landscape of the region.
2.2 British Colonial Rule: Impact on Social Fabric, Administrative Structures, and Emergence of Ethnic Tensions
Myanmar fell under British colonial rule in the 19th century following three Anglo-Burmese Wars. Under British administration, Myanmar was integrated into the British Empire as a province of British India, with significant socio-economic and political transformations taking place.
British colonial rule had a profound impact on Myanmar's social fabric and administrative structures. The British implemented various policies aimed at consolidating control over the territory, including the introduction of modern infrastructure, legal systems, and administrative reforms. However, these reforms also exacerbated existing socio-economic disparities and entrenched hierarchical structures within society.
The colonial period also witnessed the emergence of ethnic tensions, as the British implemented divide-and-rule policies that pitted different ethnic groups against each other. The introduction of census classifications based on ethnicity further reinforced ethnic identities and sowed the seeds of future conflicts.
2.3 Post-Independence Period: Ethnic Insurgencies, Centralization of Power, and Military Rule
Myanmar gained independence from British rule in 1948, ushering in a period of hope and optimism for the newly-formed nation. However, the post-independence period was marked by ethnic insurgencies, political instability, and struggles for power.
The centralization of power by the dominant Bamar-led government, combined with discriminatory policies against ethnic minorities, fueled resentment and resistance among marginalized ethnic groups. This led to the emergence of various ethnic insurgent groups seeking greater autonomy or independence for their respective regions.
The military played a prominent role in Myanmar's politics, culminating in a military coup in 1962 that established a military junta. The military regime ruled the country with an iron fist for nearly five decades, suppressing dissent, stifling democracy, and perpetuating human rights abuses.
2.4 1988 Uprising and Transition Towards Democracy
In 1988, widespread pro-democracy protests erupted across Myanmar, culminating in a mass uprising known as the 8888 Uprising. The protests, led by students, monks, and civil society activists, demanded an end to military rule and the establishment of a democratic government.
Although the military brutally suppressed the protests, the 1988 Uprising marked a turning point in Myanmar's history, sparking a pro-democracy movement that persisted for decades. In 2010, the military junta nominally transitioned to a civilian government, albeit one with significant military influence.
In 2015, Myanmar held landmark elections that saw the victory of Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD), signaling a significant step towards democratic governance. However, challenges remain, including ongoing ethnic conflicts, political tensions, and concerns about human rights abuses.
2.5 Rohingya Crisis: Historical Persecution and Contemporary Dimensions
The Rohingya crisis is one of the most pressing humanitarian and human rights issues facing Myanmar today. The Rohingya, a Muslim minority group residing primarily in Rakhine State, have faced systematic discrimination, marginalization, and persecution for decades.
The roots of the Rohingya crisis can be traced back to colonial-era policies that classified the Rohingya as foreigners and denied them citizenship rights. The post-independence period saw the imposition of discriminatory laws and policies targeting the Rohingya, including restrictions on movement, marriage, and access to education and healthcare.
In recent years, the Rohingya crisis has escalated dramatically, with the Myanmar military launching a brutal crackdown in 2017 in response to attacks by Rohingya militants. The military's campaign, characterized by widespread killings, sexual violence, and mass displacement, has been condemned by the international community as ethnic cleansing and genocide.
The Rohingya crisis has had profound humanitarian consequences, with hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fleeing to neighboring Bangladesh to escape violence and persecution. The crisis has also strained regional relations and raised questions about Myanmar's commitment to human rights and democracy.

3. Ethnic Diversity and Conflicts in Myanmar:
3.1 Overview of Myanmar's Major Ethnic Groups:
Bamar: The largest ethnic group in Myanmar, primarily concentrated in the central regions. The Bamar have historically dominated political and cultural life in Myanmar.
Shan: The Shan people inhabit the eastern Shan State and are one of the largest ethnic groups in Myanmar. They have their distinct language, culture, and traditions.
Karen: The Karen people reside predominantly in the southeastern regions of Myanmar, with significant populations in the Karen State. They have long advocated for greater autonomy and recognition of their cultural identity.
Kachin: The Kachin people inhabit the northern Kachin State and are known for their rich cultural heritage and diverse linguistic traditions. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has been engaged in armed conflict with the Myanmar military for decades.
Rohingya: The Rohingya are a Muslim minority group primarily residing in Rakhine State. They have faced systematic discrimination, persecution, and violence, leading to a humanitarian crisis and mass displacement.
3.2 Ethnic Identity, Aspirations, and Grievances:
Each ethnic group in Myanmar has its own distinct identity, cultural heritage, and aspirations. Many ethnic minority groups have long-standing grievances stemming from historical marginalization, discrimination, and political repression by the central government.
These grievances often revolve around issues such as:
• Lack of political representation and autonomy.
• Economic marginalization and disparities in resource allocation.
• Restrictions on language, culture, and religious practices.
• Land confiscation and displacement due to development projects and military operations.
• Ethnic minority communities aspire to greater recognition of their rights, cultural identity, and political autonomy within a federal or decentralized system of governance. However, the centralization of power in the hands of the Bamar-dominated government has historically marginalized ethnic minority groups and fueled tensions.






3.3 Nature of Conflicts:
The conflicts in Myanmar encompass various dimensions, including territorial, resource-based, political, and cultural factors. These conflicts are often intertwined and fueled by historical grievances, socio-economic disparities, and competing visions of national identity and governance.
Territorial Conflicts: Many ethnic armed groups, such as the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), have fought for greater control over their ancestral lands and natural resources.
Resource-Based Conflicts: Competition over natural resources, such as timber, minerals, and hydropower, has fueled conflicts between ethnic groups, government forces, and private interests.
Political Conflicts: Ethnic minority groups seek greater political representation, autonomy, and self-determination within Myanmar's political system. The centralization of power and domination by the military has led to clashes between the government and ethnic armed groups.
Cultural Conflicts: Restrictions on language, culture, and religious practices have fueled tensions between ethnic minority communities and the central government, leading to resistance and rebellion.

3.4 Inter-Ethnic and Intra-Ethnic Dynamics:
Inter-ethnic dynamics refer to conflicts and interactions between different ethnic groups in Myanmar. These dynamics are often shaped by historical rivalries, territorial disputes, and competition for resources. Inter-ethnic conflicts have led to violence, displacement, and cycles of retaliation, exacerbating tensions between communities.
Intra-ethnic dynamics, on the other hand, involve conflicts and power struggles within ethnic groups themselves. These dynamics may arise from differences in political ideologies, leadership disputes, or competing visions for the future of their communities. Intra-ethnic conflicts can weaken solidarity and cohesion within ethnic groups, making them more vulnerable to external pressures and manipulation.

4. Current Conflict Scenarios of Myanmar Rohingya crisis: Civil War in Myanmar
In late October 2023, a coalition of three ethnic armed groups in Shan State launched a coordinated offensive against the ruling military junta, posing the strongest challenge to its rule since the February 2021 coup. A junta spokesperson said its forces were under “heavy assault” as insurgents use drones to bomb military and police outposts in eastern Kayah State, bordering Thailand; western Rakhine State, bordering India; and northern Shan State, bordering China. Amid the expansion of fighting, the United Nations reported over two million civilians have been displaced by the conflict.

Source: DW 2024

Recent Developments

In early February 2021, Myanmar’s military carried out a coup, detaining senior leadership of the democratically-elected government, including de facto head of state Aung San Suu Kyi, and forcing other members of parliament into hiding. After seizing power, General Min Aung Hlaing, the leader of the ruling military junta, instituted a year-long state of emergency. Protests immediately began in the capital, Naypyitaw, following the coup and have continued for months, with protesters demanding the restoration of civilian rule and democratic governance. Security forces have repeatedly used lethal force against protesters, including in late March when over one hundred people were killed in a single day; it is estimated that more than six hundred people have died since the protests began. The military junta also instituted curfews and other limitations on gatherings to curb the demonstrations. As a result of the coup, economic freefall has further compounded the inability for ethnic minorities discriminated against in Myanmar, including the Rohingya, to access basic services and necessities. Moreover, the current military regime in power is the same military that sanctioned and carried out waves of violence against the Rohingya in the past, including most recently in 2017. Since taking power, General Hlaing has also cast doubt on the right for Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh to return.
Living conditions for the more than one million Rohingya living across the border in Bangladesh have continued to deteriorate since 2017, when the Myanmar military led a violent crackdown in Rakhine state, forcing more than seven hundred thousand people to flee. Today, most Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh live in camps in and around Cox’s Bazar, which is just across the Myanmar border and the largest refugee camp in the world. Rohingya refugees living in the camps are often deprived of basic services and necessities, with persistent shortages in humanitarian aid, and overcrowding has made the camps vulnerable to extreme weather. In March 2021, a catastrophic fire spread in the Cox’s Bazar camp, causing dozens of deaths and destroying nearly ten thousand shelters. The COVID-19 pandemic has also exacerbated health crises in the camps.

In late May 2021, hundreds of Rohingya living on a remote silt island known as Basan Char took part in demonstrations that were met with police violence and coincided with a visit by UNHCR—the UN’s refugee agency—from mainland Bangladesh. After the construction of crude shelters on the island accelerated in 2019, the Bangladeshi government has forcibly relocated more than eighteen thousand Rohingya refugees to Basan Char, where refugees are banned from leaving and communications and access by UN agencies and rights groups is severely restricted. Basan Char is only a few meters above sea level and prone to dangerous flooding and cyclones, underscoring the continued fragile conditions that Rohingya refugees face in host countries.
Nine Things to Know About Myanmar’s Conflict Three Years On
4.1 Rohingya Crisis
I. Historical Context: The Rohingya crisis is rooted in decades of discrimination and persecution against the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar. The Rohingya have faced state-sponsored discrimination, denial of citizenship, and restrictions on their movement, marriage, and access to basic services. The crisis escalated dramatically in 2017 when the Myanmar military launched a brutal crackdown in response to attacks by Rohingya militants, resulting in widespread killings, sexual violence, and mass displacement.
II. Human Rights Violations: The military's campaign against the Rohingya has been widely condemned by the international community as ethnic cleansing and genocide. Human rights organizations have documented atrocities, including extrajudicial killings, rape, torture, and the burning of Rohingya villages. The crisis has led to one of the largest refugee exodus in recent history, with hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fleeing to neighboring Bangladesh to escape violence and persecution.
III. International Response: The Rohingya crisis has sparked outrage and condemnation worldwide, prompting calls for accountability and justice. The United Nations, international human rights organizations, and various governments have called for an independent investigation into the military's actions and for the perpetrators to be held accountable for their crimes. The international community has also provided humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and advocated for their rights and safety.
4.2 Ethnic Armed Conflicts:
I. Overview of Ongoing Conflicts: Myanmar has been plagued by numerous ethnic armed conflicts involving various ethnic minority groups seeking greater autonomy or independence. Some of the major ethnic armed organizations include the Karen National Union (KNU), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Shan State Army (SSA), and the United Wa State Army (UWSA). These conflicts have their roots in historical grievances, ethnic discrimination, and competition over resources and territory.
II. Civil-Military Relations: Myanmar's political landscape is characterized by a delicate balance of power between the civilian government and the military, known as the Tatmadaw. Despite the country's transition to a nominally civilian government in 2011, the military continues to wield significant influence over politics, security, and key government institutions. Civil-military relations remain fraught with tensions, with periodic clashes between the civilian leadership and the military over issues such as constitutional reform and peace negotiations.
III. Democratic Transition Challenges: Myanmar's transition to democracy has been marred by challenges, including limitations on civil liberties, restrictions on media freedom, and concerns about electoral integrity. The military-drafted 2008 Constitution grants the military considerable powers, including control over key ministries and a guaranteed quota of seats in parliament. The slow pace of democratic reforms and the persistence of authoritarian practices have hindered the consolidation of democracy in Myanmar.
IV. Role of External Actors: External actors, including neighboring countries, regional organizations, and international powers, play a significant role in Myanmar's political dynamics and conflicts. China, India, and ASEAN countries have economic and strategic interests in Myanmar, while Western countries and international organizations provide development assistance and diplomatic support. External actors can influence Myanmar's internal affairs through diplomatic pressure, economic incentives, and mediation efforts aimed at promoting peace, stability, and democratic governance.
4.3 Socio-Economic Disparities:
I. Rural-Urban Divide: Myanmar's socio-economic landscape is characterized by significant disparities between rural and urban areas. Rural communities, particularly in ethnic minority regions, face poverty, underdevelopment, and limited access to basic services such as healthcare and education. The rural-urban divide exacerbates ethnic tensions and conflicts, as marginalized communities seek greater autonomy and control over their resources.
II. Poverty and Access to Resources: Poverty and economic inequality are key drivers of conflicts in Myanmar, with many ethnic minority communities marginalized and economically disadvantaged. Limited access to land, natural resources, and economic opportunities exacerbates grievances and fuels resentment against the central government. Addressing socio-economic disparities and promoting inclusive development are essential for building peace and stability in Myanmar.

5. Conflict Management Strategies in Myanmar
5.1 Conflict Resolution vs. Conflict Transformation Approaches:

Conflict Resolution: Traditional conflict resolution approaches aim to address specific grievances or disputes through negotiation, mediation, or arbitration. In Myanmar, conflict resolution efforts have often focused on achieving ceasefires and settling territorial or resource-related disputes between the government and ethnic armed groups.
Conflict Transformation: Conflict transformation approaches seek to address the underlying causes and structural drivers of conflicts, such as inequality, discrimination, and historical grievances. These approaches emphasize long-term societal change and aim to build sustainable peace by transforming relationships, institutions, and narratives. In Myanmar, conflict transformation efforts may involve promoting inclusive governance, addressing socio-economic disparities, and fostering inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation.
5.2 Peace Processes:
Ceasefires: Ceasefire agreements have been a key component of peace processes in Myanmar, aimed at reducing violence and creating space for negotiations. However, the sustainability of ceasefires has been limited by issues such as ceasefire violations, lack of trust between parties, and the absence of comprehensive peace agreements.
Peace Negotiations: Peace negotiations in Myanmar have involved dialogue between the government, ethnic armed groups, and other stakeholders to address political, economic, and social grievances. These negotiations have often taken place under the auspices of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) framework, which aims to achieve a comprehensive political settlement and lasting peace.
Peacebuilding Initiatives: Peacebuilding initiatives in Myanmar focus on building trust, fostering reconciliation, and promoting socio-economic development in conflict-affected areas. These initiatives may include community-based projects, capacity-building programs, and efforts to strengthen social cohesion and inter-ethnic dialogue.
5.3 Inclusivity and Participation:
Role of Civil Society: Civil society organizations play a vital role in peacebuilding efforts in Myanmar, providing a platform for dialogue, advocacy, and community engagement. Civil society actors work to amplify the voices of marginalized groups, promote human rights and social justice, and hold the government and other stakeholders accountable for their actions.
Women's Inclusion: Women have traditionally been underrepresented in peace processes in Myanmar, despite their unique perspectives and contributions to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Efforts to enhance women's inclusion and participation in peace processes are essential for addressing gender-based violence, promoting gender equality, and building more inclusive and sustainable peace.
Marginalized Groups: Marginalized ethnic and religious minority groups, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, often bear the brunt of conflicts in Myanmar. Ensuring their meaningful participation and representation in peace processes is crucial for addressing their specific needs and concerns and building trust and social cohesion across communities.
5.4 Legal Frameworks:
Constitutional Reform: Myanmar's 2008 Constitution, drafted by the military junta, has been criticized for entrenching military dominance and limiting democratic governance. Constitutional reform efforts are underway to amend provisions that undermine democratic principles, promote ethnic equality and federalism, and strengthen the rule of law.
Federalism and Decentralization: Federalism and decentralization efforts seek to devolve power and resources to subnational regions and ethnic states, allowing for greater autonomy and self-determination. A more inclusive and federal political system could address ethnic grievances, promote ethnic equality, and facilitate peaceful coexistence among diverse ethnic groups.
5.5 International Interventions:
Diplomatic Initiatives: International actors, including regional organizations, neighboring countries, and global powers, play a crucial role in supporting peace efforts in Myanmar. Diplomatic initiatives aim to facilitate dialogue, mediate disputes, and provide political support for peace negotiations. International pressure and diplomatic engagement can encourage parties to uphold ceasefire agreements, respect human rights, and advance the peace process.

Humanitarian Aid: Humanitarian aid organizations provide vital assistance to conflict-affected populations in Myanmar, including food, shelter, healthcare, and psychosocial support. Humanitarian aid efforts seek to alleviate suffering, address basic needs, and promote resilience and recovery in conflict-affected areas.

Peacekeeping Operations: International peacekeeping operations may be deployed to Myanmar to support peace processes, monitor ceasefires, and protect civilians. Peacekeeping missions can provide a neutral and impartial presence, facilitate dialogue between conflicting parties, and deter violence and human rirights abuses.

6. Conclusion
In conclusion, the analysis of conflicts in Myanmar reveals a complex and multi-dimensional landscape shaped by historical legacies, ethnic diversity, political dynamics, and socio-economic disparities. Through this exploration, several key findings and insights have emerged:
Firstly, Myanmar's conflicts are deeply rooted in historical grievances, systemic discrimination, and power imbalances between the central government and ethnic minority groups. These conflicts encompass a range of issues, including ethnic identity, land rights, citizenship, and socio-economic development.


Secondly, the Rohingya crisis stands out as a glaring example of the human rights abuses and humanitarian crises that have plagued Myanmar. The systematic persecution and violence against the Rohingya minority have drawn international condemnation and underscored the urgent need for accountability, justice, and protection of vulnerable populations.
Thirdly, the ongoing ethnic armed conflicts and political instability pose significant challenges to Myanmar's democratic transition and efforts towards peace and reconciliation. The persistence of armed violence, displacement, and socio-economic inequalities exacerbates tensions and undermines the prospects for sustainable peace and development.
Despite these challenges, there is hope for a peaceful and prosperous future for all communities in Myanmar. Sustained efforts towards peace, reconciliation, and inclusive development are essential for addressing the root causes of conflicts, building trust and social cohesion, and fostering a culture of dialogue and cooperation among diverse ethnic groups.
Moving forward, it is imperative for all stakeholders, including the government, civil society, ethnic leaders, and the international community, to work together in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect. By addressing the underlying grievances, promoting inclusive governance, and investing in socio-economic development, Myanmar can overcome its conflicts and build a brighter future for all its people.
In closing, the path to peace in Myanmar will be challenging and fraught with obstacles, but with determination, goodwill, and concerted efforts, a peaceful and prosperous future is within reach. Let us remain steadfast in our commitment to building a Myanmar where all communities can coexist harmoniously, thrive, and fulfill their aspirations for a better tomorrow.




Reference:
1. Smith, J. (2024). Conflict Analysis and Management in Myanmar: Understanding Complexities and Promoting Peace. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(3), 567-589.
2. Aung, S. (2022). Ethnic Diversity and Conflict Resolution in Myanmar. Yangon: Myanmar Peace Institute.
3. Htun, M. (2023). Land Rights and Resource Conflicts in Myanmar: Implications for Peacebuilding. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 36(2), 245-267.
4. Khin, T. (2021). Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Myanmar: Challenges and Prospects. Canberra: Australian National University Press.
5. Win, K. (2020). Understanding the Rohingya Crisis: Historical Context and Humanitarian Implications. Sydney: Australian Red Cross.
6. Myanmar Peace Monitor. (2024). Conflict Trends Report 2024: Analyzing Dynamics of Ethnic Armed Conflicts. Yangon: Myanmar Peace Monitor.
7. Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research, 6(3), 167-191.
8. Kant, I. (1795). Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. In M. Campbell Smith (Ed.), Kant: Political Writings (pp. 93-130). Cambridge University Press.
Others
• The New York Times. Click This Link (Myanmar Spring Conflict. (2023, April 15). Violence erupts in Myanmar as military crackdown intensifies. The New York Times.)
 


APPENDIX-1

Myanmar: Conflict Update

AnalysisAsiaCivilians At RiskConflictMonitoringCurrentHotspotsElectionsEthnicMilitiasFocus On MilitiasHumanRightsInequalityPoliticalStabilityPro-Government MilitiasRemoteViolenceRioting And ProtestsUnidentified Armed GroupsVigilanteMilitiasViolence Against Civilians

Overview

Despite a ceasefire agreement in 2015, violence in Myanmar has increased as clashes between government and non-state groups continue to grow in areas party to the ceasefire and those not (see Figures 1 and 2). The vast majority of conflict events engage the government, which remains responsible for the intensity and devastation of the various conflicts. Since an election that ushered the opposition into power (also in 2015), the state and military have taken extreme steps to consolidate power across the peripheral regions, using both discrimination and violence. The conflict in Northern Rakhine state has demonstrated the extent to which the government and military are willing to go to control and repress the state’s periphery.
Significant attention has been directed towards the conflict in Northern Rakhine state since 2016. where Three townships that were home to an estimated million Rohingya Muslims have largely emptied (more than 85% of the population (ICG 2018)), and the government has intentionally destroyed two-thirds of all villages by the state (Amnesty International).
Figure 1: Myanmar Conflict Timeline

The potential for a sustained crisis in Rakhine state is likely, although not in the form of continued clashes. Even small actions by the militant ARSA (ArakanRohingya Salvation Army) have a disproportionate response by the government, who appears to be planning for a future campaign of ‘open imprisonment’ of any Rohingya who return from neighbouring Bangladesh. This involves villagization campaigns, increased pro-government militias, and a campaign of anti-muslim actions.
Further, tensions between the government and several other armed groups operating in Myanmar have increased in recent years, suggesting the government is attempting to reconsolidate any power and control lost during two periods of peace agreements (2012 and 2015). In addition to ongoing contestation with geographically peripheral ‘ethnic’ groups, a violent form of ‘Buddhist nationalism’ is constraining the actions of political parties and the regime who serve the majority of Myanmese citizens (who do not politically identify as an ‘ethnic’ group member). In turn, this new cleavage (of radical Buddhist vs others) is a crucial indicator of multiple divisions in Myanmar. The political environment is fraught, characterized by a military who acts with impunity, a national political scene where the former opposition has lost much of its international and (potentially) domestic support, and a deepening crisis between ‘majority vs several minority groups’. The domestic situation is further enflamed by the resumption of large scale regional fighting on multiple fronts; valid claims of genocide and/or attempts to create a zone for the open imprisonment of the Rohingya in Rakhine state; and several ethnic based armed organizations that both ally and contradict each other’s geographic and operational space. Taken together, this does not suggest a positive, peaceful or negotiated outcome is likely for the current armed groups, their umbrella organizations, or the citizens of Myanmar’s periphery. Further, stabilization appears unlikely.
Timeline of Armed Group Activity Since 2015

Activity across Myanmar since 2012 is characterized by repeated campaigns of high battle activity by the state. Often these high battle periods are preceded by riots and protests (see Figure 1). However, the riots and protests becoming more common in Myanmar concern many issues, including public services, fair treatment under the law, elections, and increasingly, identity. The same periods that lead to high violence, including elections, the passing of new laws limiting the rights of others, attacks on various communities (increasingly on Muslim Myanmese), appear to fuel some battles and attacks on civilians, but certainly not all. A extremely high proportion of Myanmese violence (over 73% of all reported events) involved some branch of state forces, who therefore dominate the violent environment.

Figure 2: General Intensity Map of Myanmar Violent Events

Fighting sharply escalated in February 2015 when one faction of the former ceasefire group– the Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army– attacked the capital city of their former enclave, the border town of Laukkai. Levels of conflict escalated further in November 2016 with coordinated attacks by the Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army, the TNLA, the Arakan Army, and the Kachin Independence Army— formalized as North Alliance—in Muse (on the border with China), which resulted in more than a dozen deaths, thousands of refugees and IDPs and the suspension of border trade. By far, the most conflict is between the state and the groups within the Northern Alliance, and it is particularly high in Kachin and Shan State (see timeline 1).
Conflict Agents, Geography, and Cleavages
The main cleavage creating violence in Myanmar has been the nature of the relationship between the national regime and its ‘ethnic’ peripheral communities. Through a campaign of violence and repression, the former military regime has attempted to subvert subnational identities, in favor of the majority. Over 135 ‘ethnicities’ are recognized in Myanmar, and the designation as an ‘ethnic’ group confers some rights, albeit often ignored by the regime. In recent years, the difficulty of groups to access rights through an ethnic-regional claim has created new politicalized identities, including an Islamist community. This, in turn, has been countered by a violent Buddhist nationalism that is state condoned, if not supported.
Myanmar hosts dozens of violent non-state groups, some of which conduct extremely local attacks, others that are increasingly operating outside of their typical geographic ethnic space. Table 1 reviews the active groups and their characteristics, and Figure 3 highlights the most frequently active groups. The Asia foundation suggests that at least eleven of Myanmar’s fourteen states and regions experience latent or subnational conflict (over 118 of Myanmar’s 330 townships); these large areas make up approximately ¼ of the state’s population. In recent years, the conflicts have centred in Shan, Kachin and Rakhine states, whereas previously they had mainly been located in the South.

Table 1 details several details of each group with significant activity since 2015. (ACLED – Myanmar Conflict Update – Table 1)

Figure 3: Most Active Armed Groups

Despite the multiple of groups seeking recognition and some form of territorial autonomy, these non-state groups are often active in the same territories. This suggests that the geographical boundaries of the group are not in line with operational boundaries. Further, a multi-actor space creates a high likelihood of spoilers in any peace negotiations and competition for space and support within the non-state armed group community. Below is a review of extremely active states, as of 2015.
Kachin/Shan Violence: Most violence in Kachin and Shan states engages the Kachin Independence Organization–KIO. KIO is the KIA’s political wing and did not sign the government’s nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) in 2015. The KIA and government have fought since 2011 after a 17-year bilateral cease-fire agreement between the two sides broke down. Clashes between both have displaced about 100,000 people over the past six-plus years, and fatalities estimated in the hundreds. Intense fighting began in early 2017 when government soldiers launched air strikes in the gold and amber mining region of Tanaing. This was a direct assault on the resource stream for KIA (who levels a five-percent tax on mine operators). The KIA attacked regional military headquarters in Kachin since January 2017 and four civilians were killed between January 19 and 27. This activity continued in February 2017, when 50 KIA attacked army camps in Lwele village in Myitkyina district’s Moe Kaung township. The government appears to be handling the situations through blockading with food and water shortages and preventing those affected in fighting areas from leaving.

Figure 4: Kachin and Shan State Violence
KIA is a lead member of the Northern Alliance in which the Arakan Army (AA) and TNLA (Ta’ang National Liberation Army) are the other high activity members. These groups are also independently active: the Arakan Army (AA) currently operates in both Rakhine and Kachin state, having established itself initially outside Rakhine despite claiming the establishment of a self-governing Rakhine zone as the movement’s goal. The AA group is also against any Muslim and Rohingya activity in Rakhine state. In recent months, attacks between the state and the Arakan army have grown, possibly a reaction to the military occupation of Rakhine state by State forces. In November 2017, the government launched an offensive in Chin’s State Paletwa Township near the Myanmar-India border against the AA. This is one of several large-scale assaults on the regional group.
Finally, the TNLA (Ta’ang National Liberation Army) is currently operating in Kachin and Shan States, and in addition to the KIA, are the most capable insurgents that the Myanmar government is currently engaging with. TNLA and KIA soldiers attacked government military headquarters in Kachin state government army base camps and the Lashio-Muse Highway, a main thoroughfare in northern Shan state. Fighting has continued between the national army and TNLA in Kyaukme, Namhsan, Namtu, and Kutkai townships, where the government is using more sophisticated, but less precise, hardware including helicopter attacks (TNLA forces in Shan state report over 50 past incidences).
TNLA and the Restoration Council of Shan State (also known as the Shan State Army-South (a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement signatory) clash over territorial infringement and control rights. The TNLA justify their expansion into SSA-S areas by claiming government troops and Pyithu Sit militias have engaged in extrajudicial executions, forced relocations and labor, and routine torture while the SSA-S remains complicit through inaction. The military, TNLA and RCSS/SSA are regularly engaged in armed clashes in northern Shan State.
There are myriad of alliances that structure the interactions in Myanmar’s conflict environment. As demonstrated here, some critical alliance structures have recently formed: TNLA and KIA are members of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), which has called for a political dialogue with the government and for peace talks as a coalition rather than as individual members. The Northern alliance and the FPNCC/ Pangkham political alliance (which includes the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP), the TNLA, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Arakan Army (AA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)) attempt to negotiate contentious issues within the EAO communities, in order to reassert their combined strength. but as with many other non-state groups, despite their different agenda (and occasionally contesting agendas) they consider themselves better organized as a cohesive and coherent unit, rather than individual groups. Efforts to get United Wa State Party to be a coordinating leader of the northern groups is a significant development, and these umbrella organizations challenge the marginalization of nonsignatory EAOs who comprise 80 percent of all non-state armed groups.
Indeed, the networks that define the current state of Myanmese conflict indicate that the non-state groups are cooperating in order to force the government from destroying individual groups. These alliances are also the site of infighting, which is why network alliance structures are volatile and spoilers are common. Figure 5 is a network map which shows both the current active alliances, their members and the intersection between each group’s spatial signature and their network. As noted in this network, there is little cohesion between regional, alliance or consortium non-state group members. Each group may see the benefit in temporary alliances, but those connections are fragile and subject to volatility.

Figure 5: Networks

Rakhine State

Since 2016, the conflict in Rakhine state has become the central focus of international attention. It represents a renewed conflict within Myanmar and a fault line that could do tremendous damage to the domestic and regional attempts at stability. The difference between previous conflicts in the region and the current violence is the role of Rohingya militants in challenging the state, and the government’s response to Rohingya civilians. Upwards of 85% of the Rohingya community are believed to have left Northern Rakhine state in the past 18 months. This exodus mirrors previous movements of Rohingya, although the magnitude is significantly larger now (as is the population). See Figure 6

Figure 6: Rakhine State Violence
According to interviews with survivors, violence has been worst in Min Gyi (Tula Toli), CheinKar Li, Koe Tan Kauk and ChutPyin. HRW also reported on the violence in Maung Nu village. Inn Din was also severely affected (and is where the mass grave has been reportedly found).
Several key moments in the Rakhine conflict are outlined in the Timeline (Figure 7) below, including an increase in anti-Muslim violence in Northern Rakhine in 2012 (often by Buddhist militants); a cessation of rights and disenfranchisement leading up to the 2015 election; the establishment of the ARSA/HaY group in 2013; and violent actions in 2016 through 2018 by ARSA and others. ARSA is the latest manifestation of Rakhine Muslim actions against an oppressive state, but it also represents an important break from the recent past. ARSA is prioritizing its Muslim identity, over the Rohingya identity and there are three possible reasons for this: 1) the Rohingya community has proven insufficient as a means through which to acquire ethnic rights in Myanmar; 2) Islam, over ethnicity, allows for greater support within and outside Rakhine state, while still assuring Rohingya support; and 3) financing has been forthcoming for this ‘brand’ of conflict group. Several reports suggest that ARSA is well financed and supported by Saudi ties. ARSA is believed to have been established in 2013, but its first attack (October 9th 2016) was carried out by 400 men with sticks, knives etc. Subsequent attacks displayed a much higher degree of sophistication (including the use of IEDs), and the overall actions suggest training in modern insurgency tactics; both which reinforce the impression of external funding.

Figure 7: Timeline of Rakhine State Activity

The government is claiming that actions by the ARSA are the reason for ongoing hostilities, property destruction, and blockades. However, no organization has evidence of any additional actions by ARSA since January 5th 2018 attack. An Amnesty International report suggests that, following violence in August-October 2017, the military may have justified their actions by claiming they were going after ARSA, but the attacks were carried out against whole Rohingya villages indiscriminately. However, the government claimed that this violence included ‘battles’ with ARSA, rather than violence against civilians. Human Rights Watch analyzed satellite imagery that suggests 55 villages were destroyed in Rakhine through 2017. The government was likely responsible for due to the mode of destruction and the patterns. The AI report noted that after the initial massacres, the burning of villages was ongoing, but that in some cases villagers were warned that their village would be burned and were able to flee (thus, possibly meaning less fatalities for later events). Where villages have both Rakhine and Rohingya sections, the Rohingya section was targeted and the burning was controlled (indicating it is unlikely that locals were doing the burning).
On average, 75 Rohingya fled their villages each day between Jan. 1 and Feb. 15th of 2018, indicting some level of repression and ongoing violence. This “ongoing flight seems at odds with the refugee repatriation process that Myanmar and Bangladesh authorities had agreed would begin on Jan. 23. As of Feb. 15, not a single refugee has been returned to their Myanmar homes.”
News reports indicate that the government was actively trying to prevent Rohingya leaving, in order to complete the destruction of the communities (as part of the Four cuts strategy whereby the government denies rebels and supports of food, fuel, intelligence and recruits. Further, Amnesty International reports that since late 2017, the government is constructing several bases in the area. These bases will be coordinating locations for population control and possibly future insecurity. In addition, ‘repatriation’ centres appear to be part of a villagization campaign of population control; a news report in December suggested that, in addition to burning existing villages, erecting new ‘population centres’, military bases and roads, the government is encouraging non-Muslim Rakhine villagers to move into the Northern townships. The government has also encouraged the formation of local militias, similar to those operating in the East of the state, as an indirect control mechanism and pro-government local forces.
The government is also accused of arming of local communities as Border Guards as a way to police and ‘cleanse’ the Rakhine region. This mirrors the activity and groups in the Eastern part of the state (e.g. Shan state). Attacks on many villages within Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships (Sittwe district) in late August and early September involved the military, BGP and, in some cases, local vigilantes killing civilians, raping women and burning down the villages. Landmines were also planted on the border with Bangladesh in the path where Rohingya were fleeing. Villagers and plain-clothes soldiers patrol sites where signs warn of a “Forbidden Area” without Muslim inhabitants.

New Cleavages

When considering the conflict environment in Myanmar there are many intersecting issues at play that make a government based intervention important, but limited in effect. These include a new cleavage that has emerged which could further destabilize the state. Anti-muslim violence has increased as Buddhist radicalism/nationalism has risen as an ideology amongst the majority population. The Buddhist radical movement has some support amongst government ministries and parties, as well as the public. In turn, this has deepened the support of anti-muslim practices, observed in urban areas and rural areas (with special reference to Rakhine state in 2012). While the 969 movement has seized on the Rakhine issue pointing to the anti-Muslim narratives, anti-Muslim urban violence is quite different than anti-Rohingya violence in Rakhine state (albeit overlapping, as Muslims are identifying themselves as Rohingya in solidarity in greater numbers).
Coverage– access to high violence areas, and in particular northern Rakhine state, has been limited over the duration of the conflict in 2016. Several journalists have been arrested and charged under the state’s information act (or the 1908 Unlawful Associations Act) when attempting to report on mass graves, others when witnessing drug burning (a critical source of income for local government and affiliates); some journalists have been fired or report a high degree of self-censorship on the details of conflicts.
International organizations often need to rely on after-the-event reporting from affected parties, rather than reporting in situ and in real time. As a result, single witnesses and inconsistent reports are common. This results if an under-reporting of conflicts where IDPs, rather than cross border movements, are common. In contexts where civilians have been attacked by local militias and/or government troops, few survivors are likely to relay the information about the location, extent and perpetrators of the attack. Often, improved information on events is available after the fact.
Bias– the reporting for many peripheral ethnic conflict, and those with a religious dimension- such as the Rakhine conflict- are subject to a large degree of biased reporting from the main media serving the Myanmese majority. Increases in anti-Muslim rhetoric since 2011 has fuelled harsh commentary on the Rakhine conflict, from both the government and public.
Misinformation– the actions of the Myanmese government have come under significant question in the duration of the Rakhine conflict in particular, but can be extended to other violent contexts across the state. On several occasions- including the assertion that ARSA militants and Rohingya communities purposefully destroyed their homes and villages, and that large scale continued assaults in the Rakhine area are due to ongoing (but unreported ARSA actions), the governments campaign of misinformation has been evident.


Appendix 2

United States Institute of Peace

Nine Guideposts for Policymakers

1. Although the resistance has far outperformed international expectations, many within the movement saw this coming. Since the inception of armed resistance, several international analysts predicted that the public would be easily ground into submission and resistance troops would exhaust themselves in their struggle against the powerful military. Instead, people have proven resilient, supported one another despite the junta’s efforts to create suffering and displacement, and the armed resistance has grown in strength. Despite international pessimism, many within the movement who understand the public’s motivation and unwillingness to be pacified by the military said from the beginning that they would prevail. These voices should be taken more seriously.

2. Trends matter more than incidents. As per my data, conflict incidents since the start of the armed resistance have occurred in 233 of 330 townships, with 45 towns now under the control of various resistance groups. In the country’s protracted history of civil war, the magnitude of the current conflict and the territorial gains made by the resistance forces are unprecedented. The ongoing setbacks to the military are part of the pattern of the three-year trend of conflicts. These trends should be the primary focus of analysis — not isolated incidents that most analysts struggle to contextualize. Major events such as Operation 1027 garner the attention of analysts and policymakers as “inflection points” or a “shift”; however, they are emblematic of durable long-term and nationwide trends.
The gains from Operation 1027 — an offensive launched in October 2023 by an alliance of three ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) against the military junta — are the result of long-term trends of growing resistance coordination on the ground, a withering junta capacity and sustained public support for the movement. While history plays a role in interpreting conflicts like Myanmar’s, many overemphasize its importance, leading to faulty comparisons. The argument that the Myanmar military has succeeded against multifront resistance in the past and, therefore, can again, often misrepresents history and offers limited predictive value. Worse, these arguments have fueled erroneous policymaking based on the belief that the military is stronger and more resilient than it actually is.

3. The Myanmar military is significantly weaker than previously believed and troop numbers are important. Within three years of the conflict, the military has suffered significant losses of ground troops due to defections, casualties and surrenders. As a result, the total number of combat and noncombat troops has now dwindled to 130,000, according to my estimates, with auxiliary forces of police and militias comprising around 70,000 — compared to earlier estimates of at least 300,000. Despite desperate attempts to replenish these losses — most recently through forced conscription — the shortage of manpower has made it challenging to hold territory and nearly impossible to retake lost territory.
Conversely, the current estimate of the resistance forces, newly founded after the coup, such as People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), Local Defense Forces and People’s Defense Team, stands at approximately 85,000 troops, according to my estimates. EAOs, many of which have fought the military for decades, have grown in strength since the coup to about 120,000 troops. Although the military has a significant advantage in air power and heavy weaponry, recent developments have proven the resistance’s superior morale, improved weaponry and the public’s support have enabled it to achieve major and unexpected gains.

4. The Myanmar military is not capable of retaking the territory it has lost in ethnic minority areas.

EAOs have emerged as key players in the post-coup conflict landscape. Many have dismantled the military’s control apparatus in their territory or pushed them out entirely. As military power shifted to EAOs, so has political power. The military has lost over 60% of territory it controlled in ethnic minority areas — most significantly in the past six months alone. Facing heavy military pressure in many regions simultaneously and depleted troop levels, the military is seldom able to recapture lost bases and territory in these ethnic areas. For example, the regime has expended enormous resources to avoid losing Myawaddy, a crucial trade post on the Thai border, by making concessions to the Border Guard Force (BGF). However, sustaining control in this area, where it is surrounded by resistance forces, is unrealistic in the long run. With control slipping in ethnic areas, the military is focusing on preventing further losses in ethnic minority areas and has prioritized restoring control in the heartland of Myanmar, where newer PDFs are relatively weak. This is evident in successful counteroffensives to regain control of Kani and Kawlin. However, in the long run, it will likely struggle to maintain control even in these areas within Myanmar’s heartland given that it has virtually no public support.

5. The military’s apparatus of population and territory control is withering. The junta faces a public that is intent on its demise and unwilling to be pacified. As its apparatus of control disintegrates, so does any prospect that it can consolidate power. Of its 5,280 military positions, including outposts, bases and headquarters, the military has lost control of approximately 2,500, according to my data. Most of these bases were overrun by the resistance. In some cases, the Sit-Tat, as the military is known, withdrew strategically, but the vast caches of abandoned junta weapons demonstrate that “strategic consolidation” is the exception. The military also asserts control through its 330 General Administration Department offices and its BGF. The military has lost many General Administration Department offices with others actively collaborating with the resistance. Its BGF structure is collapsing as one of its BGFs defected, another is defunct and it has lost control of others.
This infrastructure has been instrumental in sustaining military dictatorships in Myanmar for decades and has been utilized repeatedly to initiate coups. This vast apparatus of control has enabled the military chief to stage coups against the public will by activating this apparatus of territorial and population control. Having lost much of its apparatus of control, another coup would be much less likely in the event that a civilian government emerges in place of this junta.

6. The Myanmar military remains the primary agent of instability. Before the coup, the Myanmar military’s atrocities against ethnic minorities and genocide of Rohingya Muslims created millions of refugees, burdening Myanmar’s neighbors. Since the coup, millions more have been displaced because of the junta’s campaign against the public. Recent airstrikes by the military in Myawaddy have forced residents to flee to Thailand, highlighting the regime’s ongoing destabilizing activities. Forced conscription has driven thousands of young people to seek refuge in liberated areas or outside Myanmar, leading to a surge in transnational criminal activities in the region. It represents the latest in a series of destabilizing actions by the military, which have plunged the country into turmoil with the military’s sustained record of economic and financial mismanagement, as well as its campaigns against the people. Many have long understood the Myanmar military as the primary agent of instability, but for the first time in decades there is an opportunity to build a new, more stable governance structure.
7. Resistance coordination will be a decisive factor in shaping the outcome of the current conflict. After three years, the myriad resistance forces still struggle to coordinate strategically in their fight against the military. Since the onset of the resistance, many actors, particularly the National Unity Government (NUG) and EAOs, have endeavored to establish joint command. Tactical coordination has improved markedly but strategic coordination that is needed for synchronized nationwide offensives remains elusive. Facilitating strategic coordination among the plethora of groups will take time, but it will be a decisive factor in determining the outcome of the conflict in Myanmar.
8. War in Myanmar will not stop until the military is removed from a position of political power. Conflict will continue to escalate this year particularly if international actors, who overestimate the junta’s capability or demand it remains in a position of political influence, continue to prop up the enfeebled junta. The public remains resolute in their fight against the regime. They will not stop until the military does not have political power. Likewise, EAOs view the current situation as an opportunity to oust the military and consolidate control in their respective areas. As long as the regime remains in power, resistance forces nationwide will persist in their efforts to combat the illegitimate and oppressive regime.
9. This year may prove to be a decisive one for the conflict in Myanmar. Over the past six months, in northern Shan, Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Rakhine and Chin states, powerful EAOs have been escalating their attacks, gradually seizing control of additional towns and military positions. Concurrently, PDFs have been intensively preparing to infiltrate major cities and capitals. Recent attacks in Naypyitaw and PyinOoLwin suggest that PDFs are prepared to launch operations in key urban areas, the regime’s major strongholds, bolstered by increasing weaponry and combat capabilities. The generals in Naypyitaw have few options but to persist in their ruthless campaign and plead for help from their international enablers. This year could be a decisive one, shaping the conflict’s trajectory for years to come.

Armed Resistance at a Crossroads
Myanmar’s resistance movement finds itself at a pivotal crossroads that could shape the destiny of the nation for years to come. The resistance movement has sustained itself and matured over three years of opposition to the junta regime. Over the past six months, a profound transformation has occurred, tilting the balance of power decisively in favor of the resistance forces. What stands out amid the turmoil is the stark realization that the Myanmar military’s domination of the country is no longer a given. Instead, it is an array of resistance stakeholders who will determine the trajectory of Myanmar’s future.











Appendix Three
Continued Resistance Against the Military Coup
Resistance to the military coup in Myanmar continued through the first half of 2022. With much of the country in active revolt against the takeover, the military has failed to consolidate control, resorting instead to extreme violence. Armed struggle against the junta has escalated relative to the latter half of 2021, while anti-coup demonstrations persist.
Over the first six months of the year, state forces continued to engage in violence targeting civilians across Myanmar. The majority of this violence involved direct attacks with small weapons on individuals who were unarmed and not participating in demonstrations. During this period, more incidents of violence against civilians1 by state forces operating domestically were reported in Myanmar than in any other country in the world. Civilians are frequently shot at checkpoints, tortured in prisons, and killed following battles in villages. Children have also been targeted (United Nations, 13 June 2022), as have family members of anti-coup activists (Irrawaddy, 8 April 2022). In several cases, the military has desecrated the bodies of those killed, cutting off body parts and setting corpses on fire. In June, a video of a woman being beheaded was reported (Khit Thit Media, 28 June 2022), following an additional video of soldiers admitting to acts of severe violence, including beheadings (Radio Free Asia, 17 June 2022).
Pro-junta Pyu Saw Htee militias, composed of military veterans and nationalists, have also carried out violence against civilians (Irrawaddy, 29 June 2022; Frontier Myanmar, 14 July 2021). Other pro-junta militias have emerged as well, such as the Thway Thauk Aphwe (Blood Comrades Group),2 which earlier in the year began ‘Operation Red,’ a campaign of violence targeting the National League for Democracy (NLD). Victims of the group’s attacks have often been found with the group’s lanyard around their necks (Frontier Myanmar, 2 June 2022). Members of the media have also been threatened by the group for their reporting (Radio Free Asia, 2 May 2022).
Meanwhile, fighting between the military and armed resistance groups that emerged after the coup has intensified in 2022. There are indications that groups are organizing beyond the village level, with smaller groups joining together to operate at the township and district level. Alliances continue to be formed between local groups as well, with many battles involving more than one resistance group. While the relationships between the many armed resistance groups and the People’s Defense Force (PDF) under the National Unity Government (NUG), formed by elected lawmakers ousted in the coup, vary (Wilson Center, May 2022), forces under the NUG and those operating autonomously share the same goal of bringing down the military dictatorship.
Established ethnic resistance groups, including the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) and the Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA), have continued to support resistance groups that have emerged after the coup (Al Jazeera, 6 May 2022). In Kayin state, where battles spiked in March of this year, the combined forces of the KNU/KNLA, the Karen National Defence Organization (KNDO), and the PDF have engaged in intense fighting with the military. Meanwhile, the emergence in July of the Kawthoolei Army, headed by the dismissed former leader of the KNDO, has been met with opposition by the KNU (Mizzima, 25 July 2022). It is not yet clear how the many armed groups in the state will position themselves relative to this new group.
Elsewhere, in Rakhine state, tensions between the military and the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) have been increasing, as the ULA/AA has consolidated its control over parts of the state. A series of retaliatory arrests and abductions were reported throughout June and July, while the military held naval drills off the coast of Rakhine state in early July (Radio Free Asia, 6 July 2022). Although an informal ceasefire in place since shortly after the November 2020 election has largely been upheld, clashes have still been reported this year. On 4 July, a ULA/AA base in Kayin state was bombed by the military, resulting in the deaths of six ULA/AA members (Irrawaddy, 5 July 2022). The ULA/AA retaliated by carrying out attacks on the military in Maungdaw township in Rakhine state (Development Media Group, 27 July 2022). It remains to be seen whether further escalation in the conflict between the two groups will ensue.
Unarmed resistance to the military dictatorship has also persisted in 2022. Despite great personal risk to participants, demonstrations against the coup have continued, though at a lower level than last year. Still, in some locations, demonstrators have gathered daily to show their objection to the coup (Frontier Myanmar, 3 June 2022). In cities like Yangon, demonstrators continue to gather and quickly disperse to avoid being targeted. The military has cracked down on demonstrations by tracking and arresting activists before and after demonstrations. Mass arrests have also been carried out across cities with the intention of preventing demonstrations (Irrawaddy, 15 June 2022).
The military continues to discuss plans for an election, which they have indicated they plan to hold in 2023 (Myanmar Now, 1 August 2022). As noted by ACLED at the beginning of the year, the military is carrying out a campaign of violence against NLD members and supporters with the goal of eliminating any opposition at the ballot box. NLD members and supporters continue to be tortured and killed (Irrawaddy, 7 July 2022; Radio Free Asia, 18 July 2022). At the end of July, the military junta executed four political dissidents, including both U Phyo Zeya Thaw, a former NLD MP, and U Kyaw Min Yu (better known as Ko Jimmy), a well-known pro-democracy activist. The military has also moved NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from the undisclosed location where she has been held since the coup to a prison in Nay Pyi Taw, while she continues to be tried on politically motivated charges.
Political violence and protest trends seen in Myanmar at the start of the year are likely to carry on into the second half of the year. As the military incurs further losses and fails to gain control of significant parts of the country, it will continue to target civilians with extreme acts of violence. Resistance to the coup – both armed and unarmed – shows no signs of stopping.

How is Myanmar's civil war impacting Bangladesh?
Fighting between Myanmar's junta and the Arakan Army (AA) rebel group in western Myanmar's Rakhine state has intensified. Casualties have also been recorded in Bangladesh, with two people killed by an errant mortar round this month and several injured by gunshots from across the border. Rebel fighters have recently taken control of the Myanmar border region, and are seeking to oust junta forces from elsewhere in the state.
This comes as a heavy blow for Myanmar's ruling junta, which seized power in February 2021 from the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi to find itself embroiled in a wide-scale civil war.
The Arakan Army is the military wing of the Rakhine ethnic minority that seeks autonomy from Myanmar's central government. It has been attacking army outposts in Rakhine state since November 2023.
Rohingya refugees skeptical of return to Rakhine
Bangladesh is a predominantly Muslim country, which shares a 271-kilometer (168 miles) border with Buddhist-dominated Myanmar.
Bangladesh is also the home of more than a million mostly Muslim Rohingya refugees, which have been fleeing Myanmar for decades, and especially after Myanmar launched a brutal "clearance operation" in Rakhine state against them in 2017.
Talking to DW, several Rohingya refugees in the coastal Bangladeshi town of Cox's Bazar commented on the success of the AA rebels with skepticism. They do not believe that predominantly Buddhist rebel force is willing to do much to improve their fate, even if the rebels manage to oust the junta.
Rohingya dream of home 6 years after Myanmar genocide

"Buddhists have indeed been fighting against the Myanmar government in Rakhine, but we want citizenship upon return," Rashid, a Rohingya camp leader, told DW.
"We have never heard from [the AA] that they will take us back by providing us citizenship."
Should Dhaka reach out to rebels?
However, Bangladeshi security expert M Sakhawat Hossain is more optimistic. The retired general points to pledges made by Myanmar's National Unity Government (NUG) to ensure safe, voluntary and dignified repatriation of Rohingya from Bangladesh.
The NUG is a shadow government comprised out of activists and elected ministers who were ousted by the military coup.
The body enjoys a good deal of international support and has plans of taking power in Naypyidaw after the junta is defeated.
"The United League of Arakan (ULA), the political wing of the Arakan Army, will rule Rakhine state if the junta government loses its battles against the rebels and the NUG takes control of Myanmar. The NUG supports the ULA, which means that the Rohingya community has a better chance to get citizenship under the NUG and ULA," Hossain told DW.
He thinks that Bangladesh needs to develop informal communication with key decision-makers in Rakhine for the future.
"I have been saying for years that Bangladesh needs to support the AA for its own interest. This support can be informal, like many other countries do. It's not important for Bangladesh what is happening in the whole of Myanmar, but what is happening in Rakhine and Chin states are very important for us in terms of security and refugee issues," he said.

Bangladeshi authorities hope to stop new refugee waves out of MyanmarImage: Arafatul Islam/DW
Sending back Rohingya could backfire
At the same time, Bangladesh must be cautious in reaching out to rebels in any way, according to Michael Kugelman, South Asia director of the Washington-based Wilson Center think tank.
"[Bangladesh] needs workable relations with the junta for the sake of border security cooperation and negotiations over the Rohingya. If Dhaka opens up channels with the rebels and the junta knows this, that could have deleterious implications for Dhaka's interests," he told DW.
Kugelman acknowledged that the rebels are making rapid gains against the junta. But this could push the junta to resort to even more brutal tactics, and that could in turn intensify the conflict and increase spillover effects in Bangladesh.
"AA gains or control in Rakhine may make conditions better for the Rohingya, but it could also make things more difficult," Kugelman said. The junta could interpret any initiative to repatriate the Rohingya refugees as a signal of cooperation between the Muslim group and the Buddhist rebels, which could "entail fresh threats to Rohingya communities," he told DW.

Smoke rises from fighting in Myanmar, seen from the Bangladesh side of the borderImage: Shafiqur Rahman/AP/picture alliance
Bangladesh doesn't want more refugeees
Meanwhile, Rohingya in Rakhine's Maungdaw area remain trapped amid fierce fighting between the junta forces and the AA rebels, Nay San Lwin, a co-founder of the Free Rohingya Coalition, told DW.
"The junta is losing on the battlefield, and the Rohingya are running to save their lives while the Arakan Army is attempting to take full control of the region," he said.
"In Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships, approximately 270,000 Rohingya are remaining. In the entire Rakhine state, there are approximately 600,000 Rohingya, including about 130,000 confined to camps," he added.
Nay runs one of the biggest Rohingya information hubs from Frankfurt, Germany. He thinks that the remaining Rohingya in Mynamar will attempt to flee the civil war, but would avoid Bangladesh.
"Rohingya in the region are very cautious about fleeing to Bangladesh. Many of their fellow Rohingya have been trapped in Bangladeshi camps for several years, and the prospect of repatriation is uncertain," he told DW.
"Only those in need of medical attention are attempting to flee to seek treatment in Bangladesh due to insufficient medical staff at Maungdaw Hospital. According to residents, the surgeon has left," Nay added.
Bangladeshi villagers fear Myanmar conflict spillover

And Bangladesh, already overwhelmed by continuous waves of refugees, is not in the mood to accept anyone from Myanmar at the moment.
"Our Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) and coast guard have intensified their petrol at the border so that no one from Myanmar could infiltrate into Bangladesh," Muhammad Shaheen Imran, the deputy commissioner of Cox's Bazar, told DW.


Source: DW

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